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Introduction 
For the past few decades, cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists have been uncovering 
evidence that human decision-making processes are prone to non-rational tendencies. Legal scholars 
have been increasingly attentive to this research; recognition of the fallibility of human judgment has 
commonly inspired calls for imposing constraints on individual choice: the psychological research is 
often seen as providing support for (some version of) paternalism. The ability of individuals to make 
good choices for themselves is seen as the fundament of contractual freedom. If human beings in 
general, and consumers in particular, are prone to systematic errors, they should simply be protected 
from themselves. The ‘from homo economicus to Homer Simpson’ joke has become quite common 
as a smart way to synthesize the main lesson of psychological research for legal scholars and 
regulators. 
‘A large part of behavioral economics describes ways people sometimes fail to behave in their own 
best interests’; ‘it is such errors (…) that can justify the need for paternalistic policies to help people 
make better decisions and come close to behaving in their own best interest’. In a sense, ‘behavioral 
economics extends the paternalistically protected category of ‘idiots’ to include most people, at 
predictable times’.1  
The main point of this essay is that this perspective seriously misrepresents the findings of cognitive 
psychology, and offers a simplistic view of its lesson for legal studies. The idea that cognitive 
psychology can provide support for paternalism is not necessarily wrong, but the issues raised are 
much more complex than it is sometimes assumed, and they revolve around the problem of 
manipulation much more than around human error itself. 
A first important point to make is that legal scholars have sometimes misunderstood behavioral 
decision theory. The psychological research itself is not designed to uncover error; it is designed to 
identify how people think. ‘The chief lesson of behavioral decision theory is not that people make 
bad choices but that they do not rely on rule-based systems, such as deductive logic or expected utility 
theory in making decisions’.2 People ‘develop rules of the thumb and rely on ad hoc perceptions, 
emotions, accumulated memory, and loose associations’; ‘although reliance on heuristics creates 
vulnerabilities in judgment, people are also highly adaptive decisionmakers’.3  
It has now become quite common to speak about a ‘dual-process’ model of the brain. We apprehend 
the world in two radically opposed ways, employing two fundamentally different modes of thought, 
which are sometimes called ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’. System 1 is fast; it is intuitive, associative, 
metaphorical, automatic, impressionistic. System 2 is slow, deliberate, effortful; its operations require 
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attention. The chief lesson of psychological research regards the importance of automatic, intuitive 
processes in human reasoning and decision-making, which has often been overshadowed by our 
tendency to identify ourselves with the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs and makes choices; 
System 2 is ‘a supporting character who beliefs herself to be the hero’.4 The flaws of our intuitive 
mind are largely outweighed by its marvels: it may be ‘the origin of much that we do wrong, but it is 
also the origin of most of what we do right- which is most of what we do’.5  
A second important observation to make is that the same notion of error may be problematic in light 
of the new psychological research. The body of findings that document the extreme sensitivity of 
choices to formulation, context and procedure ‘supports a radical challenge to the assumption, central 
to much economic theory, that stable preferences exist’: ‘the image of a decision maker who makes 
choices by consulting a preexisting preference order appears increasingly implausible’; the alternative 
image is of a decision maker who ‘constructs preferences in the context and in the format required by 
a particular situation’.6 Daniel Kahneman added that ‘of course, no one wishes to pursue the idea of 
context dependence to the point of nihilism’: choices may not be as coherent as the notion of a 
preference order would suggest, but they are far from random. On the other hand, there are cases 
where there is without doubt an error (for instance, when a given probability is underestimated or 
overestimated). Still, the idea of context dependence is at the very core of behavioral decision theory. 
When different versions of a decision problem evoke different preferences and thus elicit different 
responses, this does not mean that one of the responses is wrong: it rather raises the problem of the 
manipulability of choices, which we will discuss later. 
A third point regards the idea of people failing to behave in their own best interests because of their 
systematic errors. Once again, especially when the assumption of firm, stable preferences is 
challenged, it is in many cases questionable if someone who has been influenced through the framing 
of information and manipulation of the context is really prejudicing her own interests: the issue at 
question regards her liberty rather than her interests. Choosing one particular store or brand rather 
than another may be realistically neutral from the point of view of the consumer’s interests: the 
problem is the acceptability of some forms of manipulation. 
This leads us to the fourth point. Cognitive biases are sometimes treated as some sort of exogenous 
influences on individual behavior: they are to be taken into account as a fixed influence on behavior, 
in order to build a more realistic model of human cognition and decision and thus better legal rules. 
However, one of the central lessons of behavioral decision theory is that cognition and decision 
making is largely determined by context and the way in which problems are framed; they are thus not 
independent from the action of other market actors, and this action in its turn can be regulated by the 
law. The picture emerging from psychological research is not centered about people with stable 
preferences which make some systematic errors and should be protected from the bad consequences 
of these errors, but rather about people which are heavily influenced by the context in which their 
decisions take place; this context can be deliberately manipulated by other market actors and, directly 
or indirectly, by legal regulators themselves. 
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‘The presence of unyielding cognitive biases makes individual decisionmakers susceptible to 
manipulation by those able to influence the context in which decisions are made’. More particularly, 
‘market outcomes frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor 
to control the format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within 
which market transactions occur’. Once one accepts that individuals’ choices can be manipulated, ‘it 
follows from an economic perspective that others will exploit those tendencies for gain’7. 
The consumer’s cognitive and decisional processes are heavily influenced by context and by the way 
in which the information is framed. In some cases this will encourage or prevent errors, in other cases 
the same notion of error is hardly applicable, but consumers’ decisions will be biased in a predictable 
way. Our preferences and decisions can be influenced by deliberate behaviors which fall short of 
what can be called deceit in a traditional sense, and the role of the legal regulator is thus much more 
complex than in the traditional model, which presupposes rational actors with relatively stable 
preferences. 
The most important lesson of psychological research is thus not that individuals make errors, but 
rather that their perceptions and preferences are highly manipulable; that they are susceptible to being 
influenced by features of their surroundings in ways that they do not even suspect. The most 
important, but also most difficult challenges come from the awareness of this manipulability, which 
may or may not result in true errors by the individuals. 
In the following pages, we will examine some examples of market practices which are able to 
influence the consumers’ choices and behaviors in ways which could not be predicted if one 
presupposed perfect rationality and unlimited cognitive resources. The next paragraph will describe 
some examples of practices which involve an element of deceit. The third paragraph will focus on a 
much more problematic kind of practices, which are clearly able to exert an influence on consumers 
but where the element of deceit is less clear.  
 
Error and deceit 
 
According to European law, a commercial practice is regarded as misleading, and thus unfair, if ‘in 
any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even 
if the information is factually correct’.8 
Probably, the easiest part of the lesson of psychological research for consumer law scholars and 
practitioners consists of highlighting cases in which, because of their cognitive limits and biases, 
consumers can be induced in errors, without giving them false information. 
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For instance, many pricing practices have well-documented effects on consumer behavior which are 
apparently due to consumers’ sub-optimal way of processing information. One of the most simple 
examples is partitioned pricing: the partitioning of the price charged to consumers into two or more 
components (such as installation charges, handling charges, service charges, shipping charges, taxes, 
etc.) can generate higher demand compared to combined pricing. This is due to the fact that consumers 
(or at least a part of them) do not process the total price accurately: instead of calculating the total 
cost as the mathematical sum of the base price and the surcharge, they use simplifying heuristics; 
even when not ignoring the surcharge completely, they use the base price as a cognitive anchor and 
then tend to adjust insufficiently upward to incorporate the surcharge.9 Subjects exposed to 
partitioned prices recall significantly lower total costs than subjects exposed to combined prices. 
Another similar example regards the ubiquitous practice of odd pricing (e.g. pricing an item at $ 9.99 
rather than $ 10.00). There is a body of literature showing that odd-ending prices are less likely than 
even-ending prices to be recalled accurately and that they tend to be underestimated.10 This may be 
due to a tendency to drop off, or give less attention to, a price’s rightmost digits.11  
Of course no simple conclusion can be drawn by the experimental literature. But when it uncovers 
systematic errors in the way in which information is processed, at the very least it highlights areas of 
potential suspicion of consumers’ deception, which are not immediately evident if one presupposes 
perfect rationality and unlimited cognitive resources of consumers. 
In other cases, however, one cannot really speak of errors. For instance, psychologists have long 
recognized that people often behave in ways which are inconsistent with expected utility theory in 
order to be coherent with their previous decisions. In part, this can be explained with the so-called 
sunk cost effect: people have difficulty in ignoring sunk costs, and tend to continue an endeavor once 
an investment in money, effort or time has been made.12 However, the effects of commitment go 
beyond the cases where sunk costs are present: once people have committed to an action, they are 
more likely to be consistent with that particular deed. In a well-known series of experiments, Robert 
Cialdini and others have demonstrated the effectiveness of the ‘low-ball technique’: by inducing 
subjects to make an initial decision to perform a target behavior and then making the costs of 
performing that behavior known, a requester obtains greater compliance than when subjects are 
informed of the full costs of the behavior from the outset, even if the initial decision is in fact 
reversible.13 These experiments have been inspired by the wide-spread use of such tactics by sales 
organizations to produce compliance from their costumers: for instance a given car is offered at an 
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extremely good price, and once the customer has made the decision for that specific car the effective 
price is increased in some way. This ‘commitment and consistency’ principle14 has different, not 
mutually exclusive explanations. A high degree of consistency is socially valued; on the other hand, 
stubborn consistency generally simplifies daily life, by reducing the number of decisions that we have 
to take. It may be partially related with some sort of confirmation bias, which leads individuals to 
focus their attention on information that confirm their previous choice, in order to reduce cognitive 
dissonance. 
While the tendency to be consistent with previous decisions does not necessarily lead to errors in the 
proper sense, it can be easily exploited to manipulate consumers’ choices. At the very least, this 
implies that some deceitful behaviors which would seem relatively innocuous if people behaved 
according to expected utility theory are in fact much more dangerous. One clear example is bait 
advertising, which is considered as a misleading practice by the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive: ‘making an invitation to purchase products at a specified price without disclosing the 
existence of any reasonable grounds the trader may have for believing that he will not be able to offer 
for supply or to procure another trader to supply, those products or equivalent products at that price 
for a period that is, and in quantities that are, reasonable having regard to the product, the scale of 
advertising of the product and the price offered’.15 Consumers enticed with discounts will be reluctant 
to continue searching elsewhere even when the offer is no longer available; or they may in any case 
do some shopping on the store or supermarket, once they have spent time and effort to get there. 
More generally, consumer law should look with great suspicion to every commercial practice where 
the initial information is ambiguous, incomplete or misleading, even if this is clearly corrected at 
some later stage, before the contract is concluded. It is clear that once the consumer has made even 
an initial, tentative decision about the product or service he is interested in, the market operator has 
already gained a decisive advantage. Psychology of decision making’s lesson in this class of cases is 
that error and deceit are often only apparently innocuous, given the predictable biases in human 





Other marketing techniques involve no misleading at all; rather they involve crafting the context or 
framing information in ways which systematically influence consumers’ behavior and choices, 
without their targets being even aware of them.  
We can start from a rather banal example. A huge body of literature shows that a brief, casual 
interpersonal touch has a positive influence on consumers’ evaluations and behavior: for instance a 
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brief touch by a waiter improves the restaurant evaluation and increases tips;16 shoppers in a 
supermarket are more likely to try a new food product and buy it if touched during the request.17 Now, 
it can be hardly said that touching the customers, even if it is part of a deliberate selling technique, is 
in itself unfair. However, this example shows what kind of advantages a skillful and aggressive seller 
may draw from the mere possibility of face-to-face interaction with a consumer; this mere possibility 
should not be gained through deceit or arrogant intrusion (for instance, ‘conducting personal visits to 
the consumer’s home ignoring the consumer’s request to leave or not to return’, which is an 
aggressive commercial practice according to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive18);  on the 
other hand, it contributes to explain why consumers should be given a cooling-off period when they 
are made object of sudden and unexpected solicitations, like in the case of off-premises contracts. 
A clear example of how careful crafting of context can influence consumers’ choices is atmospherics, 
that is ‘the effort to design buying environments to produce specific emotional effects in the buyer 
that enhance his purchase probability’.19  While the real effectiveness of atmospherics is very much 
discussed, there is, for instance, a huge body of research on the effects of music20 and scents21 on 
consumers’ behavior. While these results should be taken with caution, a study has reported that 
playing French or German music in a supermarket respectively increases the sales of French or 
German wines;22 and several studies seem to show that costumers are prepared to spend more when 
classical music is played in a wine store or restaurant, possibly because it creates the perception of an 
upmarket environment.23   
Drawing consequences for consumer law from this literature is indeed quite difficult. At least in some 
cases, such practices at least draw some ethical questions. For instance, a study has raised the question 
of covert ambient scents.24 Apparently, subliminal odors (that is odors that are below the detection 
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threshold) have a stronger effect on people than odors of which they are aware. An experimental 
study has shown how subliminal odors can affect the likeability judgment of photographs of faces.25 
Now, it has been questioned whether the use of subliminal scents to influence consumers would be 
ethically acceptable, since consumers should have at least the opportunity to recognize that a 
persuasion attempt is occurring; and, to a lesser degree, the same worry extends to all uses of scent 
to influence consumers, since ‘even if consumers are aware of the scent, they may not interpret it as 
a persuasion attempt’. 26 
However, this kind of techniques to influence consumers raises a more fundamental question about 
the manipulability of consumers’ preferences. Before getting back at it, it may be useful to consider 
another rather obvious, and very important, example of manipulation of the context: product 
placement in supermarkets27. Retailers analyze scanner data and use computer simulations to inform 
shelf space allocation decisions, with the ultimate goal of increasing purchases.  Placing staple goods 
in the far corners of the store is only the first step: the layout and location of products in any retail 
outlet is used in order to give shoppers maximum exposure to what is on sale and maximum 
encouragement to buy it. Impulse items are located at the checkout area, so that the inevitable 
checkout line wait may encourage impulse buying. Children’s brands are usually on the lowest 
shelves in the store, in order to let a child take the initiative to ask for a product or toddle over and 
pick it out herself. The choice of products placed in the highly valuable eye-level real estate is of 
curse carefully considered; on the other hand, it seems that consumers mainly look at the right side, 
and the right side of the aisle is preferred to the left.  
Now, some of these practices may be questionable in themselves. At least in some extreme cases, 
setting an emotive trap where a consumer is unexpectedly exposed to strong psychological pressures 
in order to stimulate impulse buying may be seen as a form of undue influence. However, since there 
is no neutral setting of the context in which market interactions take place, it is quite reasonable that 
market operators try to create an environment which attracts consumers and stimulates sales. The 
fundamental question that is raised by a full understanding of the measure in which consumers’ 
preferences and choices are influenced by apparently peripheral elements of the context regards 
nothing less than the fundament of contractual freedom itself. 
The idea that free interaction of market forces is the most efficient way for satisfying preexisting, 
spontaneous preferences by the consumers is no small part of the reasons for self-restraint by public 
decision-makers. If a given kind of background music has an influence on how much wine is 
consumed, or even on what kind of wine is consumed, if product placement has an influence on which 
brands or even which goods are acquired, it becomes increasingly difficult to conceive consumers’ 
choices as revealing anything similar to spontaneous preferences. 
There is today rather compelling evidence that people do not face everyday decision tasks armed with 
a stable set of preferences. Indeed, some experimental studies have shown a phenomenon labelled 
‘choice blindness’: after being asked to make a rather trivial choice between two alternatives (for 
instance, between two faces on the basis of their attractiveness, or between two varieties of jam on 
the basis of their taste), people are not usually able to detect the mismatch if they are later presented 
with the opposite choice as their own; and in fact they are able to produce confabulatory reports when 
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asked to describe the reasons behind their choices.28 As it has been remarked, if people ‘are willing 
to accept a reversal of their decision as being what they really wanted, the outcome of a choice cannot 
be said to simply reveal an underlying preference’.29 
Now, as Daniel Kahneman has put it, this idea should not be stressed to the point of nihilism. Humans 
can obviously form very specific and detailed prior intentions, are often able to resist temptations, 
and their choices possess a certain degree of coherence. But it should be realistically admitted that 
many relatively unimportant, everyday choices do not reveal anything similar to the consumers’ true 
preferences. If the context in which they are taken were not manipulated, they would probably be 
largely casual. In the measure in which manufacturers and sellers are able to exert an influence, they 
will be systematically biased in a way which increases their profits. 
 
 
Psychology of decision making’s (not-so-easy) lesson for consumer law 
Psychology of decision making’s lesson for consumer law is relatively simple and straightforward 
when it identifies ways in which humans can be induced in errors, exploiting their cognitive limits 
and biases. Commercial practices which, even if they do not involve false information, are likely to 
induce in error consumers, or at least identifiable groups of particularly vulnerable consumers, should 
be regarded as deceitful by the law (which of course leaves open the question of identifying the most 
appropriate legal remedies). 
The question is much more complex for marketing techniques which are able to influence the 
consumers’ preferences and choices without inducing them in error. Of course, making consumers 
behave according to rational choice theory cannot be a realistic goal for consumer law. The context-
dependence of preferences and the role of moods and emotions are an inherent part of human mental 
functioning, and banning any technique aimed at favorably influencing consumers would be 
senseless. The consequences for consumer law are in this case much more nuanced and complex. 
A first consequence of the literature evidencing the manipulability of consumers’ preferences and 
choices is simply that it weakens one of the traditional arguments against public regulation. Market 
outcomes do not reflect stable, spontaneous preferences of the consumers; they are instead influenced 
by the ability of manufacturers and sellers to control the setting within which market transactions 
occur and to systematically bias the consumers’ choices in order to increase their profits. In light of 
this, it can hardly be said that by altering ‘spontaneous’ market outcomes a public decision maker is 
necessarily preventing the consumers from satisfying their preferences.  
On the other hand, while manipulation in itself cannot realistically be banned, consumer law probably 
needs to build a model of decision making process which is acceptably serene and deliberate, in order 
to identify what amounts to an undue influence. This is a complex normative task, and the answer 
will often be a question of degree. Aggressive forms of social interaction, extreme time pressures, 
and strong emotional conditions are all elements of suspicion.   
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A third point to be stressed is that the effects of manipulation should not be evaluated from the point of view of 
single consumers. It does not necessarily lead to a ‘wrong’ or detrimental choice; on the other hand, from the 
point of view of the single consumer there is hardly sufficient reason to say that she should be relieved of 
responsibility for her choices. After all temptations can be resisted, and outside of extreme conditions our 
behavior is rather influenced than determined by contextual stimuli. From the perspective of the enterprises, 
however, it is evident that once it is clear that a particular manipulation of the context will systematically, if not 
irresistibly, influence consumers in a way that goes to their advantage, they will have a strong incentive to exploit 
those opportunities; the problem is thus not so much protection of single consumers, but rather what means of 
competition are acceptable and desirable from a more general point of view.  Some marketing techniques may 
result in a public nuisance, or they may exert a kind of psychological pressure on the individual which, even if it 
falls short of being truly an undue influence, is unpleasant and disturbing.  Making persistent and unwanted 
solicitations by telephone is a banal but illustrative example.  
It may be interesting to mention the widely documented phenomenon of ego depletion.30 Choice, active response, 
self-regulation and all other variants of voluntary effort draw at least partly on a shared pool of mental energy. 
The self’s capacity for active volition is limited: the exertion of self-control is depleting, and reduces the ability to 
exert self-control when the next challenge comes around. Resisting temptations and other forms of psychological 
pressure is certainly possible, but not without cost for the individual; and consumer law may take into account 
this kind of psychological externalities, generated by some particularly aggressive marketing techniques.  
The lesson of psychology of decision making for consumer law is complex and nuanced. It provides a more realistic 
analysis of consumers’ choices and motivations. It cannot dictate the normative solutions, and, certainly, it does 
not suggest that having the consumer behave as a homo oeconomicus is a feasible and probably not even a 
desirable goal. 
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